There were a number of factors that led to the Allied invasions in North Africa in November 1942. Most of these factors were military, but the political element also cannot be ignored. 1942 was an election year in the United States.

In the event, for a variety of reasons, the invasion had to be delayed until after the 1942 Congressional elections. To his credit, Roosevelt did not attempt to overrule Marshal's military decision, but Stephen Early, the president's press secretary, is reported to have said to General George C. Marshall

"You almost lost us control of Congress by the delay!"

• George C. Marshall: Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue p15

Once the overall strategy of Europe First had been decided, the options for offensive actions by the Allies against German and Italian forces were limited.

It is worth remembering in this context, that seven strategic objectives had been agreed at the U.S.–British Staff Conference (also known as ABC-1) which had ended in March 1941:

1. To maintain an economic blockade of the Axis by sea, land, air, and by commodity control through diplomatic and financial means.
2. To conduct a sustained air offensive to destroy Axis military power.
3. To effect "early elimination" of Italy as an Axis partner (of which much more, of a less harmonious nature, would be heard in 1943).
4. To conduct raids and minor offensives.
5. To support neutrals and underground groups in resisting the Axis.
6. To build up the necessary forces for the eventual offensive against Germany.
7. To capture positions from which to launch that offensive.

• Mark Skinner Watson: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, Center of Military History, US Army, 1991, pp376-377

Despite pressure from some American commanders, there was no realistic prospect of a large-scale cross-Channel invasion taking place in 1942. Operation Jubilee (the reconnaissance-in-force attack on Dieppe by a predominantly Canadian force in August 1942) would highlight many of the problems that would have to be overcome to achieve a successful invasion.

On the other hand, the victory of the British Eighth Army at the Second Battle of El Alamein created the opportunity to trap German and Italian forces in North Africa in a pincer movement, by invading Vichy-controlled French North Africa (the operation was initially code-named 'GYMNAST', and later rechristened 'TORCH').

Roosevelt had also promised Stalin a second front by the end of the year in order to help relieve pressure on the Eastern Front. Operation Gymnast/Torch was the only realistic option to make good on that promise.

Under the circumstances, Roosevelt faced the choice of either abandoning the Europe First strategy, and reneging on his promise to Stalin, or going ahead with Operation Torch.

In addition to the military challenges and other international factors described above, Roosevelt also faced domestic political considerations. As mentioned earlier, 1942 was an election year. On 17 April 1942, George B. Wolf had written to the President and observed that:

"... in a recent Sunday evening broadcast, Pearson and Allen quoted Jim Farley to the effect that the Democrats could lose control of Congress at the coming election, barring a military victory by the United States or the United Nations"

In fact, this was a very real possibility, and could not but have been a factor in Roosevelt's decisions. Roosevelt needed a military victory to bolster morale and ease concerns about his handling of the war. However, when interviewed in 1956, General George C, Marshall summarised events in the following terms:

In defending the president on the 1942 political thing, I can say that when I went to him with TORCH, he put up his hands (General Marshall elevated his hands in an attitude of prayer) and said, "Please make it before Election Day." However, when I found we had to have more time and put it after election, he never said a word about it. Steve Early, who was told only an hour before the attack, blew up about it because it wasn't before election. We just couldn't do it before election. The president was very courageous about that. I said so in my report.

• George C. Marshall: Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue p593

In the event, the Democrats managed to hold onto both houses of Congress in the 1942 elections, although they lost 45 seats in the House of Representatives and 8 seats in the Senate. As mentioned above, Stephen Early, the president's press secretary, was less than impressed by the fact that Operation Torch took place too late to influence the vote.

A 2017 article titled Operation Torch at 75: FDR and the Domestic Politics of the North African Invasion, by Carrie A Lee, then an assistant professor at the U.S. Air War College, offers further detail and sources about the political aspects that underlay Roosevelt's decision to go ahead with Operation Torch. Her summary assessment was that:

"... domestic political priorities shaped — in fact, drove — the American president’s decision-making about military operations in 1942."

While many might argue about whether domestic political priorities actually drove Roosevelt's decision-making, I think it is certain that the importance of those priorities should absolutely not be underestimated.

I just wanted to add an angle which I didn't see included in sempaiscuba's answer which I voted for and accepted. Sempaiscuba went into the US domestic political motives which contributed to FDR's desire for American forces to see action in the European theater in 1942. But why North Africa on the Nazi's periphery, why not a cross channel invasion as FDR's military advisers were unanimously recommending. As FDR and Churchill had promised Stalin, A second front in Europe in 1942.

Second Front
At Teheran, Joseph Stalin reminded Churchill and Roosevelt of a previous promise of landing troops in Western Europe in 1942.

Short Answer:
It was Churchill with unanimous support from the British general staff which refused to support a cross channel invasion in 1942 favored by the US Military. Churchill had been lord of the Admiralty during the disastrous Gallipoli landing which gave him a hyper appreciation for the risks of large scale amphibious landings. One of the primary risks which Churchill and the British General staff were concerned about was the untested American Army. Churchill lobbied for smaller peripheral operations as a way to give the US army experience before he would commit British forces to support a cross channel invasion.

General Marshal went so far as to suggest to Roosevelt that the U.S. abandon the Germany-first strategy and take the offensive in the Pacific. Roosevelt "disapproved" the proposal saying it would do nothing to help Russia.

Admiral King and Admiral Leahy the Chief of US Navy Operations and the Chief of Staff to the Commander and Chief respectively, both strongly favored the Europe First strategy "but so long as "it was doubtful when—if ever—the British would consent to a cross-Channel operation they disliked sending to the United Kingdom american men and materiel which were desperately needed in the war with Japan."

George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory 1943–1945. p. 305. by Forrest C. Pogue (1973)
At the Casablanca Conference, King was accused by Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke of favoring the Pacific war, and the argument became heated. The combative General Joseph Stilwell wrote: "Brooke got nasty, and King got good and sore. King almost climbed over the table at Brooke. God, he was mad. I wished he had socked him."

.

Rethinking Roosevelt as Commander and Chief
In “The Mantle of Command,” Hamilton details how Roosevelt overruled the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of War Henry Stimson and U.S. Army Chief of Staff George Marshall when they strongly advocated an invasion across the English Channel in 1942 to open up a Second Front.

The US Military was frustrated that all the logistics and troops being prioritized to Europe were being stock piled and were not being used.

The primary opponents to opening up a front in Europe in 1942 was Churchill and his military advisers who convinced FDR to postpone a cross channel landing. Churchill argued for operation Torch a landing in French North West Africa where the Americans could expect little to no opposition. The French soldiers were former allies, and the French generals in charge of those soldiers were eventually negotiated with to cease their opposition after relatively few casualties for an invasion of similar magnitude.. ( about 500 American's died. )

OPERATION TORCH AT 75: FDR AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF THE NORTH AFRICAN INVASION Even as late as June 1942, the decision to land in North Africa was anything but assured. It was one of several potential operations being debated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and Roosevelt did not even approve the landings until the end of July. U.S. military planners were almost universally against the North Africa landings, feeling the United States was being drawn into a peripheral war to protect British colonial interests. Instead, they favored the logistically intensive cross-channel invasion plan known as Roundup because it took a direct approach and would be able to draw additional German units away from the Eastern Front. However, Churchill and the British chiefs of staff were unanimous in their refusal to support a cross-channel invasion until American troops had been battle-tested. Despite the apparent impasse, Roosevelt remained adamant that an offensive action occur in 1942, going so far as to promise Soviet leader Joseph Stalin a second front before the new year.

The first time the United States army did come into direct contact with the Nazi's would be Feb of 1943, 4 months after Torch, Kasserine Pass: America's Most Humiliating Defeat of World War II where the US would be routed, inspiring Eisenhower to begin to make changes in leadership, organizational components, and tactics.

George C. Marshall and the “Europe-First” Strategy, 1939–1951:
Stimson warned Churchill in the summer of 1943 that “only by an intellectual effort” had the American people “been convinced that Germany was their most dangerous enemy and should be disposed of before Japan”; the enemy they “really hated, if they hated anyone,” was the one that had “dealt them a foul blow” at Pearl Harbor.17 Throughout the war, Marshall as well as Roosevelt remained aware of this, and with it the fact that public patience was not limitless: victory over Germany had to come quickly or public pressure, supported by the Navy as well as MacArthur, might force a dramatic shift in U.S. global strategy

FDR did have a political motivation to see American troops involved in 1942, but it wasn't solely the elections of 1942. Every other year is an election year in the United States and FDR had a 60% majority in Congress and a 71% majority in the senate. Even with Operation Torch occurring Nov 8th and election day occurring Nov 3, 1942 the democrats retained a 20 seat majority in the senate, and a narrow majority in congress.

After pearl Harbor the First War Powers act of 1941(Dec 1941) and Second War Powers act(March of 1942) gave the President sweeping authority to conduct the war as he deemed fit. The President's new war powers came at Congress's expense and were legislatively mandated to stay in effect until six months after the war had concluded. Congress's major legislation in 1943-1944 are almost laughable considering the US was a country at war spending hundreds of billions of dollars and dramatically changing all aspect of the citizens lives. Congresses role in this period was largely restricted to planning for soldiers leaving the service.

• 12/17/1943 Chinese Exclusion Repeal act, Congress agreed to allow immigration from China.
• 2/3/1944 The Mustering out Payment Act,
• 6/6/1944 The Serviceman readjustment Act
• 6/27/1944 The Veterans Preference Act
• 7/1/1944 Public Health Service Act
• 12/22/1944 The Flood Containment Act

FDR's political problem was that millions of Americans had volunteered for military service, the US had retooled the entire economy to put it on a war footing, Americans were facing rationing of food, consumer goods, and transportation. A significant portion of that material and most of the men coming out of training was going to Britain. Politically that looked terrible if they weren't to be used. FDR's political problem was thus one of public relations rather than domestic politics alone.

FDR's need to show military progress in 1942, was somewhat satisfied by action in the Pacific War.

• Doolittle's raid on Tokyo April 1942,
• Japan's defeat at Coral Sea May of 1942,
• most especially the Battle of Midway in June 1942, called turning point in the Pacific War,

These events especially Midway, freed up Roosevelt's hand to agree to the UK's insistence on Operation Torch in July of 1942.

There is no doubt Stalin preferred the 1942 cross channel European front he had been promised. Stalin wrote Churchill a letter August 13, 1942 after being briefed on Operation Torch attesting to his preference.

In Retrospect the United States did reevaluate it's Europe first strategy. Today we know that in !942, until dec 1943 the United States sent more men and equipment to the Pacific. It was not until early 1944 when preparation for the Normandy landings, that American forces in Europe surpassed those in the Pacific.And even in 1944 the policy of fighting Germany first was absent as the US pursued major offensives in the Pacific like the Philippines which committed 1 million US forces just 4 months after D-Day.see:

• American First Analysis

It is true that the US was asked to maintain 3 divisions in Australia in early 1942 at the request of Winston Churchill. However the United States had 95 Divisions in WWII almost all active by the end of 1942. The Three divisions protecting Australia does not explain why the United States had more troops deployed to the Pacific until Dec 1943. And European troops did not exceed Pacific troops until early 1944. At best this troop and logistical deployments demonstrate that the US turned away from Europe first in 1942 and pursued a relatively balanced two front strategy. Just as the US General Staff and Presidential Advisors had told the British they would in leading up to Operation Torch.

US Military Manpower by year 1789-1997

Contrary to the general statements that the invasion of Africa was of no benefit to Russia - Stalin personally expressed approval of the African and Mediterranean operations. Without the African invasion Italy would have not needed to retain the number of divisions it did - and Field Marshall Kesselring's very capable services could have been used to advantage elsewhere. ['Smiling Albert' served in a major role, usually with reasonable distinction, in more theatres than almost any other major German leader].

Torch was the precursor to Sicily and Italy.
The German capitulation in Africa lost the Germans a large number of competent and battle hardened troops. (As well as losses during battle, about 150,000 German and 100,000 Italian troops surrendered after operation torch and over 100,000 French forces who had not already been "captured" subsequently joined the Allied war effort).

The invasion of the European mainland in 1942 would have been an utter debacle for the Allies. At that stage the US conception of what was involved was severely lacking. Africa provided a very good grounding for the later US competence in Europe.
To quote Wikipedia

• In the west, the forces of the First Army came under attack at the end of January, being forced back from the Faïd Pass and then suffering a reversal at Sidi Bou Zid on 14–15 February. Axis forces pushed on to Sbeitla and then to the Kasserine Pass on 19 February, where the U.S. II Corps retreated in disarray until heavy Allied reinforcements halted the Axis advance on 22 February. Fredendall was replaced by George Patton.

After that .... :-)

The comments on "what Stalin thought" brought to mind this 'analysis' written immediately after the 1942 Moscow conference.

While jocularly put (in the extreme :-) ) this poem of Wavell's summarises the conclusion of what was concluded at the 1942 Stalin-Churchill conference in Moscow. Written by Wavell in a bomber (used as a transport aircraft) on the return flight. From here

Twoje pytanie daje dwie odrębne kwestie dotyczące uzasadnienia wyboru Operacji Torch przez aliantów:

• Po pierwsze, dlaczego alianci zaatakowali w Afryce Północnej, a nie bezpośrednio w Europie (np. Młot kowalski). Była to kwestia „wewnątrz-sojusznicza”, ponieważ Amerykanie chcieli zaatakować bezpośrednio w Europie, podczas gdy Brytyjczycy woleli „operacje peryferyjne” i chcieli zabezpieczyć Morze Śródziemne.
• Po drugie, dlaczego zaatakowali w Afryce Północnej w Strefa francuskiego wstrzymania, a nie bezpośrednio na siłach Osi w Libii i Tunezji? Po udzieleniu odpowiedzi na pierwsze pytanie wpisujesz nowe wydanie. Jest to kwestia polityczna (czy Vichy powinna pozostać w Afryce Północnej?) I kwestia wojskowa (czy sojusznicy byli w stanie wylądować w pobliżu sił Osi)?

Powinieneś spróbuj uzyskać informacje na temat tych dwóch punktów, aby uściślić swoje pytanie.

EDYTUJ: Szczegóły dotyczące różnych czynników

Biorąc pod uwagę komentarze i istniejące odpowiedzi, Opiszę tę odpowiedź nie na temat tego, jak amerykańscy oficerowie zostali zmuszeni do operacji „Pochodnia”, ale na:

• Dlaczego Brytyjczycy chcieli operacji peryferyjnej?
• Dlaczego Amerykanie byli na korzyść operacji czołowej?
• Dlaczego lokalizacja „Torch”?

Najpierw brytyjska „strategia peryferyjna” : To jest coś, co pochodzi z czasów wojen napoleońskich. Podczas I wojny światowej Brytyjczycy walczyli czołowo i mieli gorzkie chwile na lądzie iw powietrzu. Jednak na morzu z powodzeniem zastosowali strategię powstrzymania niemieckich działań na Oceanie Atlantyckim i austriackich na Morzu Śródziemnym. Udało im się także skutecznie przeciwdziałać Imperium Osmańskiemu, na Synaju, na przykład odpierając ataki osmańskie i wywołując rebelie ze słynnym „arabskim Lawrence”. Jednak ponownie, ataki czołowe na ważne pozycje osmańskie zakończyły się niepowodzeniem (chociaż nie porażkami) pod Gallipoli i Mezopotamią.

Na początku drugiej wojny światowej należy pamiętać, że armia brytyjska była pokonana prawie wszędzie. Tylko daleko od terytoriów metropolitalnych ich wrogów (Niemcy, Włochy), zdolnych do utrudniania wrogich linii logistycznych, siły brytyjskie i Wspólnoty Narodów odniosły sukces w pokonaniu swoich wrogów: na przykład Włochów w Afryce Wschodniej, Francuzów Vichy w Syrii i Libanie. , Rebelianci iraccy.

Kiedy ZSRR wkroczył do walki, mieli okazję zastosować peryferyjną strategię „w stylu napoleońskim” i w tym celu wysyłali dostawy do ZSRR. Kontynuowali walkę z Kriegsmarine w obronie Egiptu, ale ZSRR chciał bezpośrednich ataków na Niemcy.

W ten sposób Wielka Brytania rozpoczęła bombardowania Niemiec. Nocą w miastach: bardzo peryferyjny sposób uderzania wojsk niemieckich, ale sposób, który może okazać się skuteczny. Próbowali też akcji komandosów: Sukcesy w Norwegii, z dala od Niemiec. Porażka pod Dieppe, przed ciężką niemiecką obroną (choć sukces w powietrzu wyczerpał się).

Więc kiedy Amerykanie przyjdą ze swoją nową armią, nie doświadczeni, i powiedzmy: zaatakujmy europejskie wybrzeże , Brytyjczycy mają dobre powody, by im powiedzieć: „Jesteście głupi, nie możemy zaatakować ani w ramach nalotu, ani w ramach operacji wyzwolenia. Ale chodźcie ze swoimi samolotami i statkami.”

Po drugie: Cóż, to łatwa uwaga:

• Jeśli chcesz wygrać z Niemcami i Japonią, nie spiesz się. Masz potencjał ludzki i sprzętowy, powinieneś ich użyć tak szybko, jak to możliwe
• Jeśli ZSRR poprosi cię o to, albo może zawrzeć oddzielny pokój, naprawdę się spieszysz, więc Amerykanie chcieli na początku bezpośredniego atak na Niemcy.

Chodzi o to, że się mylili: ich armia zostałaby wymordowana w wyniku takiej akcji, nalotu lub prawdziwej inwazji na Europę.

Po trzecie: biorąc pod uwagę punkty 1 i 2, Brytyjczycy zasugerowali pomoc w opanowaniu osi w Afryce, co było drugorzędnym sukcesem, który później doprowadziłby do ataku na Europę. Amerykanie się zgodzili, bo zrozumieli, że lepiej zacząć na luzie.

Dlaczego wylądowali we francuskiej strefie Afryki? Nie mieli wyboru i Wolni Francuzi popchnęli ich do takiej akcji.

• Lądowanie bezpośrednio w Tunezji jest niebezpieczne z powodu włoskiej marynarki wojennej, lotnictwa państw Osi oraz armii AfrikaKorps i Messe w Tunezji.
• Lądowanie w Maghrebie daje wystarczająco dużo czasu, aby stworzyć solidną armię przed walką z Osią
• Wolni Francuzi chcieli narzucić nową Francję: Amerykanie i Brytyjczycy wciąż mieli wątpliwości co do wojska (De Gaulle), który chciałby być nowym lider. W przypadku Torcha alianci skontaktowali się z Francuzami i wkrótce zdali sobie sprawę, że będzie to ostateczny test: albo Vichy w Afryce zbierze się do nich, albo z nimi walczy. W końcu pojawił się jakoś do krótkiej walki „o honor”. Ostatecznie Wolna Francja z powodzeniem zainwestowała w tę strefę i stworzyła nową armię spośród ludności w Afryce Północnej, ale to już inna historia.

Podsumowując, lądowanie w Maghrebie dla Torcha zaowocowało:

• Oceń sytuację polityczną
• Osiągnij drugorzędny sukces w walce z byłymi niebezpiecznymi siłami
• Przygotuj się na działania przeciwko Europie (zwłaszcza Włochom)
• Spraw, aby siły amerykańskie stanęły w obliczu prawdziwej walki i zwiększ efektywność

Roosevelt's Political Imperative
Roosevelt was of the view that US public opinion required immediate successful military activity by US forces before the end of 1942. As others have stated, an election was to be held late in that year, which must have been a factor, but in general ensuring continued public support for the war effort was always an important consideration for the US leadership. The joint decision by the United States and Britain to pursue a 'Germany First' strategy precluded an offensive in the Pacific in Roosevelt's eyes, as he believed this would upset the agreed Allied strategy and run the risk of damaging or wrecking the coalition. Similarly his "promise" to Stalin that a Second Front in Europe would be opened up in 1942 to take pressure off the Soviet defense was also something Roosevelt did not wish to back away from.

Strategic Considerations
With the preferred option of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff of a Pacific offensive off the table, US military leaders were faced with choosing between the only two realistic options available to them in Europe:

• The 1942 cross-Channel invasion of France code-named SLEDGEHAMMER.
• The 1942 invasion of French North Africa code-named GYMNAST.

The SLEDGEHAMMER cross-Channel invasion of France was overwhelmingly supported by US military commanders, who felt that GYMNAST was a strategically pointless operation which was motivated by British imperial interests and which would result in a dispersal of effort and most likely cause the 1943 invasion of France, code-named ROUNDUP, to be delayed until 1944, thus providing no immediate relief for the Soviets in 1942 and delaying the actual proposed 1943 Second Front for yet another year.

Roosevelt, on the other hand, supported the British in their belief that the Mediterranean was a vital part of the European theater, and that operations there could achieve meaningful gains against both Germany and Italy. British planners had determined that a 1942 SLEDGEHAMMER invasion of France was possible, but only on a limited scale, and as such would not provide meaningful relief for the Soviet Union, and would have little value in keeping them in the war. As the survival of the Soviet Union was believed to be still in the balance in mid-1942, it was felt to be too great a risk to land forces in France only to have them thrown back into the sea should the Soviets collapse. This would be an unacceptable political disaster for both the British and Americans.

The Decision
The GYMNAST invasion of French North Africa offered the possibility of an easy military victory in 1942, which would secure the North African coast, and create a base from which British and American forces could continue to operate into Europe and the Middle East in the event of a Soviet collapse. The threat to the Atlantic would be significantly reduced, and Allied logistics into Europe and the Middle East placed on a more secure footing. The map below shows clearly the improved situation in the Atlantic resulting from the conquest of North Africa. A key moment of decision seems to have been the agreement between Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins, and Churchill, in mid-1942, that GYMNAST would not cause a delay to the 1943 ROUNDUP invasion. With this understanding, Roosevelt gave the order for the invasion of French North Africa, now code-named TORCH, to proceed before the year's end.

The above is sourced from the excellent:

Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II, by Mark A. Stoler (2000)

Map from Hyperwar